The Role of Constitutional Courts in Intergovernmental Conflict Resolution. The Argentine Case

Abstract

The constitutional and federal theory has debated what the safeguard mechanisms in modern federations are or should be, with two conflicting positions. One maintains that the mechanisms are essentially political (political safeguards), since the institutional design of the federal government is intended to guarantee adequate representation of subnational governments. The other position holds that the judiciary, in general, and the supreme courts (or constitutional courts) in particular, are the bodies that act as mechanisms to protect the federal system through the resolution of specific cases. This paper seeks to analyze the position taken by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation of the Argentine Republic in resolving intergovernmental conflicts (both vertical and horizontal), particularly in light of the emergence of new jurisprudence that has gained importance in the last decade. The paper concludes that the Argentine Court has opted for an intermediate position: it recognizes itself as an actor with institutional capacity to resolve intergovernmental conflicts, identifying, providing content, and enforcing the general constitutional principle of federalism, while at the same time emphasizing the importance of political mechanisms for conflict resolution. It orients, guides, and even exhorts constituent actors to resolve disputes through institutional dialogue and negotiation.